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Aesthetics, Aestheticians, and Critics
Howard S. Becker

Aesthetics as Activity
Aestheticians study the premises and arguments
people use to justify classifying things and activities as
"beautiful," "artistic," "art," "not-art," "good art,"
"bad art," and so on. They construct systems with
which to make and justify such classifications as well
as specific instances of their application. Critics apply
aesthetic systems to specific art works and arrive at
judgments of their worth and explications of what
gives them that worth.
In this view aesthetics is an activity rather than a
body of doctrine. Aestheticians are not the only people
who engage in this activity. Most participants in art
worlds make aesthetic judgments frequently. Aesthetic
principles, arguments, and judgments make up an important part of the body of conventions by means of
which members of art worlds act together. Creating an
explicit aesthetic may precede, follow, or be simultaneous with developing the techniques, forms, and
works which make up the art world's output, and it
may be done by any of the participants in that world.
Sometimes artists themselves formulate the aesthetic
explicitly, although they often develop it only implicitly
through their continuing, daily choices of materials
and forms.
In complex and highly developed art worlds, specialized professionals-critics and philosopherscreate logically organized and philosophically defensible aesthetic systems, and the creation of aesthetic
systems can become a major industry in its own right.
An aesthetician whose language foreshadows a sociologically based system I will examine below describes
what aestheticians do:
Being a member of the Institution of Art ... does not presuppose any explicit knowledge of the constitutional and
regulative rules of the Institution. To find and formulate
these is the job of a special kind of officers of the Institution , the aestheticians or philosophers of art, at least if
aesthetics is conceived in the modern way as the philosophical discipline that deals with the concepts we use
when we talk about, think about or in other ways "handle"
works of art. On the basis of their own understanding of
the Institution of Art as a whole, it is the task of aestheticians to analyze the ways all the different persons and
groups talk and act as members of the Institution, and
through this to see which are the actual rules that make up
the logical framework of the Institution and according to
which the procedures within the Institution take place ....
·i~~mY~t'r::g~

: : :~ ~ ~'~' ''~>tt~r~~:::~:t~H~t%.m

11

Howard S. Becker is Professor of Sociology and Urban Affairs at Northwestern University. His recent
work has focused on the use of photography in social
science, visual sociology, and the sociology of art.

Within the Institution of Art specific statements of
fact- results of a correctly performed elucidation and interpretation of a work of art, say-entail specific evaluations. Consitutive rules lay down specific criteria of evaluation that are binding for members of the Institution.
[Kj0rup 1976:4 7 -48]

We need not believe that it works so neatly to see that
art world participants understand the role of aestheticians and aesthetics this way.
An art world has many uses for an explicit aesthetic
system. It ties the activities of participants to the tradition of the art, justifying their demands for theresources and advantages ordinarily available to people
who produce that kind of art. To be specific, if I can argue cogently that jazz merits as serious consideration
on aesthetic grounds as other forms of art music, then
as a jazz player I can compete for grants and fellowships from the National Endowment for the Arts and
faculty positions in music schools, perform in the same
halls as symphony orchestras, and require the same
attention to the nuances of my work as the most ''serious'' classical composer or performer. An aesthetic
shows that, on general grounds successfully argued to
be valid, what art world members do belongs to the
same class as other activities already enjoying the advantages of being "art."
A well-argued and successfully defended aesthetic
also guides working participants in the production of
specific art works. Among the things they keep in mind
in making the innumerable small decisions that cumulatively shape the work are whether and how those decisions might be defended on general grounds. Of
course, working artists do not refer every small problem to its most general philosophical grounding to decide how to deal with it, but they know when their decisions run afoul of such theories, if only through a
vague sense of something "wrong." A general aesthetic comes into play more explicitly when someone
suggests a major change in conventional practice. If,
as a jazz player, I want to give up the conventional
twelve- and thirty-two bar formats in which improvising
has traditionally taken place in favor of those in which
the length of phrases and sections is among the elements to be improvised, then I need a defensible explanation of why such a change should be made.
A coherent and defensible aesthetic, further, can
help stabilize values and thus regularize practice. Stabilizing value is not just a philosophical exercise; I am
not talking about value in the ordinary sociological
sense, but rather about attributes and objects people
find valuable. Art world participants who agree on a
work's value can act toward it in roughly similar ways.
An aesthetic providing a basis on which people can
assign the same value to things in a reliable and dependable way makes regular patterns of cooperation
possible. When values are stable, and can be depended on to be stable, other things stabilize as well:
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the monetary value of works and thus the business arrangements on which the art world runs, the reputations of artists and collectors, and the worth of institutional and personal collec~ions. The aesthetic created
by aestheticians justifies the selections of collectors
by providing a theoretical rationale for their activity.
From this point of view, aesthetic value arises out of
a consensus of the participants in an art world. Without that consensus, or just to the degree that one does
not exist, value does not exist in any sociologically
meaningful sense. (By this I do not suggest a sociological imperialism over theories of value, but rather the
notion that judgments ot value not held jointly by members of an art world cannot provide the basis for collective activity which assumes those judgments, and
thus do not affect their activities significantly, if at all.)
A work is deemed good, therefore valuable, through
the achievement of consensus about the basis on
which it is to be judged and through the application of
the agreed-on aesthetic principles to the particular
case.
But many styles and schools compete for attention
within an organized art world, demanding that their
works be shown, published, or performed in place of
those produced by adherents of other styles and
schools. Since the art world's distribution system has
a finite capacity, all works and schools cannot be presented by it and thus be eligible for the rewards and
advantages of presentation. Groups compete for access to those rewards, among other ways, by logical
argument proving why they merit presentation. Logical
analysis seldom settles arguments over the allocation
of resources, but participants in art worlds, and especially the people who control access to distribution
channels, often feel that what they do must be logically
defensible. The heat arising in discussions of aesthetics usually occurs because what is being decided is
not only an abstract philosophical question but also an
, allocation of valuable resources. Whether jazz is
''really'' music or photography ''really'' art, whether
free-form jazz is "really" jazz and therefore music or
fashion photographs are "really" photography and
therefore art are in part discussions about whether
people who play free-form jazz can perform in jazz
, clubs for the already existing jazz audience and
whether fashion photographs can be exhibited and
sold in important galleries and museums.
Aestheticians, then, provide that element in the
battle for recognition of particular styles and schools
which consists of making the arguments to convince
1 other participants in an art world that the work del serves, on logically argued grounds, inclusion within
, whatever categories that world concerns itself with.
· The co •• servatism of art worlds, arising out of the way
( conventional practices cluster in neatly meshed pack< ages of mutually adjusted activities, materials, and
1 places, means that changes will not find an easy re-
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ception. Most changes proposed to participants in art
worlds are minor, leaving untouched most of the ways
things are conventionally done. The world of symphonic music, for instance, has not changed the length
of concert programs very much in recent years, for the
very good reason that, because of union agreements,
it would increase their costs to lengthen the programs
and, because audiences expect eighty or ninety minutes of music for the price of a ticket, they dare not
shorten them very much. (That was not always the
case. Probably as a result of the unionization of musicians, among other things, concert programs have
shortened appreciably since, say, Beethoven's time,
when one concert, for instance, contained two symphonies, a piqno concerto, a concert aria and duet for
voices, and a period of Beethoven ·improvising on the
piano [Forbes 1970:255].) Nor has the basic instrumentation of the orchestra changed, nor have the tonal
materials used (i.e., the conventional tempered chromatic scale), nor the places in which the music is presented. Because of all these conservative pressures,
someone must make a strong argument if some substantially new practice, even a minor one, is to infiltrate an existing art world.
Readers of aesthetic works cannot fail to notice the
moralistic tone of the writing. Aestheticians take it for
granted that their job is to find a foolproof formula by
which things which do not deserve to be called art are
weeded out from the works which have earned that
honorific title. I emphasize "deserve" and "earn" because aesthetic writing insists on a real moral difference between art and not-art. Aestheticians do not intend simply to classify things into useful categories, as
we might classify species of plants, but rather to separate the deserving from the undeserving, and to do it
definitively. They do not want to take an inclusive approach to art, counting in everything that might conceivably add interest or value; they take an exclusionary position, rather, looking for a defensible
line of reasoning to validate the omission of unworthy
work. The nature of the enterprise-the bestowing of
honorific titles-requires them to rule some things out,
for there is no special honor in a title every conceivable object or activity is entitled to. Since bestowing
the title "art" involves moral elements, aestheticians
emphasize a foolproof formula; ideally, there should
be no ambiguous cases. That aesthetic positions frequently emerge in the course of fighting for the acceptance of something new does not alter the situation. Such positions, too, need to show that some
things are not-art in order to justify the claim that
something else is. Aesthetics which declare that
everything is art do not satisfy people who create or
use them in the life of an art world.
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Aesthetics and Organization
The rest of what aestheticians and critics do is to provide a running revision of the value-creating theory,
which, in the form of criticism, continuously adapts the
premises of the theory to the works artists actually
produce. Artists produce new work in resp~nse not
only to the considerations of for~al ae~thet1cs but ~l~o
to the traditions of the art worlds 1n wh1ch they partiCIpate-traditions profitably viewed (Kuble~ 196~) as sequences of problem definitions and solut1o~~; 1n re- .
sponse to suggestions implicit in other tra?1t~ons~ as 1n
the influence of African art on Western pa1ntmg; 1n response to the possibilities contained in new technical
developments; and so on. But an existing aesthetic
needs to be kept up to date so that it continues to validate logically what has become important art work in
the experience of audiences, and thus keeping the
connection between what has already been validated
and what is now being proposed alive and consistent.
Since aesthetic principles and systems are part of
the package of interdependent practices that make up
an art world, they will both influence and be influenced
by such aspects of it as the organization of training of
potential artists and viewers, the organization of financial and other modes of support, and the modes of distribution and presentation of works. They will especially be influenced by a strain toward consistency that
is implicit in the idea of "art."
''Art'' is too crude a concept to capture what is at
work in these situations. Like other complex concepts,
it really is a generalization about the nature of reality,
although somewhat disguised. When we try to define
it, we find many anomalous cases-cases which meet
some, but not all, of the criteria implied or expressed
by the concept. In the case of art, we usually mean
and understand something like this, at a minimum: a
work possessed of aesthetic value, however that is defined; a work justified by a coherent and defensible
aesthetic; a work recognized by appropriate people as
having that kind of value; a work displayed in appropriate places (hung in museums, played at concerts). In
many instances, however, works have some, but not
all, of these attributes. They are exhibited and valued
but either do not have aesthetic value or have aesthetic value but are not exhibited and valued by the
right people. The concept of art suggests that we will
find all these things co-occuring in the real world;
when they do not co-occur we have the definitional
troubles which have always plagued the concept of
art. I will return to this problem later when I consider
the institutional theory of art.
One reason for the mutual influence between aesthetic theories and the organizations that make up an
art world is that some people in art worlds try to minimize these inconsistencies by bringing theory and
practice into line so that there are fewer anomalous

cases; others, who wish to upset the status quo, of
course insist on the anomalies. To illustrate the point,
consider this question: How many great (or excellent
or good) works of art are there? I myself am not concerned with fixing a number, nor do I think that the
number (however we might calculate it) is important.
But looking at that question will make clear those influences.
In 1975, Bill Arnold organized "The Bus Show," an
exhibition of photographs to be displayed on 500 New
York City buses (Carlson and Arnold 1978). He intended by this means ''to present excellent photographs in a public space'' and thus to a much larger
audience than it ordinarly reaches and to allow many
more photographers' work to be seen than would ordinarily be the case. The photographs were to be displayed in the space ordinarily used for advertising; to
fill the advertising space on one bus required seventeen photographs of varying sizes, from nine to sixteen
inches in height. To fill 500 buses thus required 8,500
photographs. Arnold intended all of them to be current
work by contemporary photographers.
Are there actually 8,500 ''excellent'' contemporary
photographs which merit that kind of public display?
Asking that question presupposes an aesthetic and a
critical position from which we could evaluate photographs, deciding which ones were or were not of sufficiently high quality. Without attempting to specify the
content of such an aesthetic, imagine a simplified
case. Suppose that quality is a unidimensional attribute so that we can rank all photographs as having
more or less of it. (In reality, we would find that competent members of the art photography world, even
those who belong to onaof its many competing segments, use a large and varied assortment of dimensions in judging photographs.) We can then easily tell
whether any photograph is better, worse, or equal to
any other. But we would still not know how many of
them were worthy of public display, how many merited
being called "great" or "excellent" or "beautiful,"
and how many were worth being included in a museum
collection or listed in a comprehensive history of art
photography.
To make those judgments requires establishing a
necessarily arbitrary cutoff point. Even if we decide
that a substantial "break" at some point in an otherwise smooth distribution makes it easy to see a major
difference on either side of it, to use such a break as
the cutting point would be practically justifiable but
logically arbitrary. But aesthetic systems propose and
justify such judgments and divisions of existing art
works all the time. In fact, the ''Bus Show'' shocked
people by its implication that the line could justifiably
be drawn where it would have to be drawn in order to
fill all 500 buses, and not where it would be more conventionally drawn (if we wanted to have a show of the
best in contemporary photography, we would find our-
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selves including, if we followed current museum practice, between 100 and 200 prints).
If aesthetic systems justify dividing art works into
those worthy of djsplay or performance and those not,
that will influence and be influenced by the institutions
and organizations in which such displays and performances occur. Institutions have some flexibility in the
amount of work they can present to the public, but not
much. Existing facilities (concert halls, art galleries
and museums, libraries) have finite amounts of space;
existing canons of taste limit the use to which that
space can be put (we no longer feel it appropriate to
hang paintings floor to ceiling in the manner of the
Paris Salon); and audience expectations and conventionalized attention spans impose further limits (more
music could be performed if audiences were used to
sitting through six-hour instead of two-hour concerts,
although the financial problems, given current union
wage scales, would make that impossible anyway).
Existing facilities can always be expanded, but at any
particular time there is only so much space or time,
and only so many works can therefore be displayed.
The aesthetic of the world which has such facilities
at its disposal can fix the point on our hypothetical one
dimension of quality so as to produce just the number
of works for which there is exhibition space. It can fix
the standard so that there are fewer works to be displayed or rewarded than there is room for (something
of this sort happens when a prize-awarding committee
decides that no work is worthy of a prize that year). Or
it can fix the standard so that many more works are
judged adequate than there is room for. Either of the
latter two situations produces difficulties, throwing into
doubt the adequacy of the art world's institutional apparatus, the validity of its aesthetic, or both. There is,
thus, some pressure for the aesthetic to operate on a
standard flexible enough to produce approximately the
amount of work for which the organizations have room
and, conversely, for the institutions to generate the
amount of exhibition opportunity required by the works
the aesthetic certifies as being of the appropriate quality. These numbers come into further rough agreement
when artists devote themselves to work for which there
is room, withdrawing their effort from media and formats which are ''filled up.''
When new styles of art emerge they compete for
available space, in part by proposing new aesthetic
standards according to which their work merits space
in existing facilities. They also create new facilities for
display, as in the c~se of the "Bus Show." Art worlds
differ in their flexibility, in the ease with which they can
enlarge the number of works which can easily be
made available for public inspection in conventional
facilities. Modern societies have relatively little trouble
accommodating vast amounts of printed material in libraries (although not in easily accessible bookstores
[Newman 1973]). Music can similarly be distributed in
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recorded performances in large amounts. But live performances of musical works of various kinds have so
few outlets that it becomes reasonable for people to
begin to compose music solely for recording, even to
the extent of relying on effects which cannot be produced live, but require the mechanisms of an elaborately outfitted recording studio.
If aesthetic systems in fact move flexibly so as to
continue to have the relationship I have just described
with the mechanisms of distribution which characterize
an art world, then even the most absolute of them,
those which most resolutely draw a strict line between
"art" and "not-art," have in practice a kind of relativism which defeats that aim. The problem so created is
spoken to in an interesting way by the institutional theory of aesthetics.

An Institutional Theory of Aesthetics
This paper, focusing as it does on questions of social
organization, does not attempt to develop a sociologically based theory of aesthetics. In fact, from the perspective just sketched of the role of aesthetics in art
worlds, it is clear that an aesthetic developed in the
world of sociology would be an idle exercise, since
only aesthetics developed in connection with the operations of art worlds are likely to have much influence in
them. (See Gans 197 4 for an interesting attempt by a
sociologist to develop an aesthetic, especially in relation to the question of the aesthetic value of mass media works.) Ironically enough, a number of philosphers
have produced a theory that, if not sociological, is sufficiently based on sociological considerations to let us
see what such an aesthetic might look like. Worth inspection on that account alone, analysis of its premises and of the problems that have arisen in connection with it will also clarify some issues considered
earlier.
Textbooks in aesthetics typically distinguish and
describe several differing, sometimes contradictory,
theories by which one can decide what is art, what is
not, what is beautiful, what is not. The coexistence of
these theories in the texts is not at all surprising, indicating that no one has demonstrated finally, to universal satisfaction, a foolproof way of making those
distinctions and that aesthetic theories, like ethical
theories, continue to be debated. We might expect
what is roughly true, that new theories-rivaling, extending, or amending previous ones-arise when
older theories fail to give an adequate account of the
virtues of some work which has been widely accepted
by knowledgeable members of the relevant art world.
When an aesthetic theory cannot legitimate logically
what is already legitimate in other ways, someone will
construct the theory that does legitimate it. (What I say
here should be understood as pseudohistory, in-
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dicating in a narrative form some relationships which
may or may not have arisen exactly as I say they did.)
Thus, putting it crudely, for a long time works of visual art could be judged on the basis of an imitation
theory, according to which the object of visual art was
to imitate nature. At some point that theory no longer
explained well-regarded new works of art-Monet's
haystacks and cathedrals, for instance, even if they
were rationalized as experiments in capturing the relationship between light and color, or Van Gogh's late
works. A theory of art as expression then found the virtues of works to reside in their ability to express and
communicate the emotions, ideas, and personalities of
the artists who made them. That theory in turn had to
be repaired or replaced so that it might deal with geometric abstraction, action painting, and other works
that could not be understood in those terms-just as
neither theory nor their analogs would be able to say
anything useful about aleatory music, for instance.
The institutional theory aims to solve the problems
raised by works that outrage both commonsense and
finer sensibilities by showing no trace of the artist at
all, either in skill or intention. Institutional theorists
concern themselves with works like the urinal or the
snow shovel exhibited by Marcel Duchamp, their only
claim to being art apparently lying in Duchamp's signature on them, or the Brillo boxes constructed and
exhibited by Andy Warhol. The commonsense critique
of these works is that anyone could have done them,
that they require no skill or insight, that they do not imitate anything in nature because they are nature, that
they do not express anything interesting because they
are no more than commonplace objects. The critique
of those with finer sensibilities is much the same.
Nevertheless, those very works gained great renown in the world of contemporary visual art, inspiring
many more works like them. Confronted by this fait accompli, aestheticians acted boldly to develop a theory
that placed the artistic character and quality of the
work outside the physical art object itself. They found
those qualities, instead, in the relation of the objects to
an existing art world, to those institutions and organizations in which art was produced, distributed, appreciated, and discussed.
Arthur Danto and George Dickie have presented the
most important statements of this theory. Danto concerned himself with the essence of art, with what in the
relation between object and art world made that object
art. In his famous statement of the problem, he said:
To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry-an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge
of the history of art: an artworld. [Danto 1964:580]

The theory out of which the idea of making the Brillo
box arose, the relation of that idea to other ideas about
what makes art works art and to other objects those
works inspired-all of these create a context in which
the making of the Brillo box and the box itself become
art exactly because that context gives them that sort of
meaning. In another version:
The moment something is considered an artwork, it becomes subject to an interpretation. It owes its existence as
an artwork to this, and when its claim to art is defeated, it
loses its interpretation and becomes a mere thing. The interpretation is in some measure a function of the -artistic
context of the work: it means something different depending on its art-historical location, its antecedents, and the
like. And as an artwork, finally, it acquires a structure
which an object photographically similar to it is simply
disqualified from sustaining if it is a real thing. Art exists in
an atmosphere of interpretation and an artwork is thus a
vehicle of interpretation. [Danto 1973:15]

Dickie deals with the organizational forms and
mechanisms. According to his perfected definition:
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact,
(2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it
the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or
persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the
artworld). [Dickie 1975:34]

A sizable and interesting secondary literature has
grown up around this point of view, criticizing and amplifying it (Cohen 1973; Sclafani 1973a and b; Blizek
197 4; Danto 197 4; Mitias 1975; Silvers 1976). Sociologists will undoubtedly see a family resemblance between the institutional theory of art and the various sociological theories that make their subject matter the
way social definitions create reality (e.g., the so-called
labeling theory of deviance), for both make the character of their subject matter depend on the way people
acting collectively define that character.
There is a difference, however, and not a surprising
one. Philosophers tend to argue from hypothetical examples and with stripped-down references to reality.
Thus, the '' artworld'' referred to by Dickie and Dan to
does not have a great deal of meat on its bones, only
what is minimally necessary to make the points they
want to make, and the criticisms made of their positions do not make much reference to the character of
existing art worlds or ones which have existed, but
rather to matters of logical consistency in the constructs used in the theory. None of the participants in
these discussions develop as organizationally complicated a conception of what an art world is as I have
elsewhere (Becker 197 4, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979),
although I do not think my description is incompatible
with their arguments. If we make use of a more extended and empirically based notion of what an art
world is, however, we can make headway on some
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problems the philosophical discussion has bogged
down in, thus perhaps being helpful to aestheticians
while simultaneously deepening our own analysis.
Who? Who can confer on something the status of
candidate for appreciation, and thus ratify it as art?
What person or persons can act on behalf of that certain social institution, the art world? Dickie settles this
question boldly. He describes the art world as having
core personnel:
... a loosely organized, but nevertheless related, set of
persons including artists ... producers, museum directors, museum-goers, theater-goers, reporters for newspapers, critics for publications of all sorts, art historians, art
theorists, philosophers of art, and others. These are the
people who keep the machinery of the artworld working
and thereby provide for its continuing existence. [Dickie
1975:35-36]

But he also insists:
In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of
the artworld is thereby a member. [Ibid.]
That last sentence, of course, alerts aestheticians;
Dickie's approach will probably not satisfy their feeling
that it is necessary to be able to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving and this definition is
therefore going to be too broad. They cannot accept
the implication of Dickie's remark, which is that the
representatives of the art world who will be conferring
the honorific status of art on objects are self-appointed, and express their discontent in a rash of humorous examples. What if a zookeeper decides that he
is a member of the art world and, in that capacity, confers the status of candidate for appreciation, and thus
of art work, on the elephant he tends? That could not
really make the elephant a work of art, could it? Because, after all, the zookeeper really could not act on
behalf of the art world, could he? We all know the answers: The elephant just isn't an art work (Dickie
1971; Blizek 197 4).
But how do we know that? We know it because we
have a commonsense understanding of the organization of art worlds. A relevant feature of organized art
worlds is that, however their position is justified, some
people are commonly seen by many or most interested
parties as being more entitled to speak on behalf of the
art world than others; the entitlement stems from their
being recognized by the other participants in the cooperative activities through which that world's works are
produced and consumed as people who are entitled to
do that. Whether other art world members accept
these people as capable of deciding what art is because they have more experience, because they have
an innate gift for recognizing art, or simply because
they are, after all, the people who are in charge of
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such things and therefore ought to know-whatever
the reason, what gives them the ability to make the distinction and make it stick is that the other participants
agree that they should be allowed to do it and that this
agreement is one of the routine and interdependent
activities that make up the art world.
Sociological analysts need not decide who is entitled to decide that things are art (or, to use Dickie's
language, to confer the status of candidate for appreciation). We need only observe which people members
of the art world treat as capable of doing that and allow to do it, in the sense that once those people have
decided something is art, the others act as though it
were in whatever ways might be appropriate.
Some common observations made in art worlds
show that the philosophical desire to be able to make
definitive distinctions between art and non-art objects
cannot be satisfied by the institutional theory. For one
thing, there is seldom complete agreement on who is
entitled to speak on behalf of the art world as a whole.
Some people occupy institutional positions which give
them the de facto right to decide what will be acceptable. Museum directors, for instance, had the power to
decide whether photography was an art because they
could decide whether or not to exhibit photographs in
their museums. They even had the power to decide
what kind of art (e.g., "minor" or whatever the opposite of that is) photography was by deciding whether
photographs would be exhibited in the main galleries
in which paintings were ordinarily exhibited or whether
they would be confined to a special place with less
prestige in which only photographs were shown. But
some people might argue that museum directors are
incompetent to make the judgments they do make, that
in a better world they would not be allowed to make
such judgments because they are ignorant, prejudiced, and influenced by extraneous considerations.
Some might think they are too avant-garde and do not
give proper attention to established styles and genres;
others, just the opposite (Haacke 1976, passim).
Art world members also disagree over whether the
decisions of occupants of certain positions really make
any difference; this disagreement reflects their ambiguous position in the art world. It is frequently not clear
whether a particular critic's decision has any consequences or whether the activities of others will be
conditioned by that decision; very often that will depend on a variety of conting.e ncies arising from political shifts and struggles within the art world. Insofar as
art world members find this process ambiguous, the
status of such people as critics, dealers, and members
of prize and fellowship committees will likewise be ambiguous, as will the status of whatever pronouncements they make. The ambiguity is not remediable by
philosophic or social analysis; it exists because the
people whose deference would ratify the status defer
sporadically and erratically.
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Thus, we cannot make the an-or-nothing judgments
aestheticians would like to make about whether works
are or are not art. Since the degree of consensus
about who can decide what art is will vary greatly from
one situation to another, a realistic view reflects that
uncertainty by allowing "art-ness," whether or not an
object is art, to be a continuous variable rather than an
all-or-nothing dichotomy.
Similarly, we can see that art worlds vary in the
kinds of activities carried on by their members that embody and ratify the assigning of the status of art to an
object or event. On the one hand, material benefits,
such as the award of fellowships, prizes, commissions,
display space, and other exhibition opportunities (publication, production, etc.), have the immediate consequence of helping the artist to continue producing
work. On the other hand, such intangible benefits as
being taken seriously by the more knowledgeable
members of the art world have indirect but important
consequences for artistic careers, placing the recipient in the flow of ideas in which change and development take place in the world's concerns and providing
day-to-day validation of work concerns and help with
daily problems-rewards denied those who are merely
successful in more conventional career terms.
What? What characteristics must an object have to
be a work of art? The institutional theory suggests that
anything might be capable of appreciation. In fact, in
response to a critic who says that some objects, 'ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, the
plastic forks given at some drive-in restaurants"- just
cannot be appreciated (Cohen 1973: 78), Dickie says:
But why cannot the ordinary qualities of Fountain [the urinal Duchamp exhibited as a work of art]- its gleaming
white surface, the depth revealed when it reflects images
of surrounding objects, its pleasing oval shape- be appreciated. It has qualities similar to those of works by Brancusi and Moore which many do not balk at saying they appreciate. Similarly, thumbtacks, envelopes, and plastic
forks have qualities that can be appreciated if one makes
the effort to focus attention on them. One of the values of
photography is its ability to focus on and bring out the
qualities of quite ordinary objects. And the same sort of
thing can be done without the benefit of photography just
by looking. [Dickie 1975: 42]

Can anything at all be turned into art, just by someone's saying so?
. . . it cannot be this simple: even if in the end it is successful christening which makes an object art, not every
attempt at christening is successful. There are bound to
be conditions to be met both by the namer and the thing to
be named, and if they are completely unsatisfied, then
saying "I christen ... "will not be to christen. [Cohen
1973: 80]

Cohen is right: not every attempt to label something art
is successful. But it does not follow that there are, accordingly, some constraints on the nature of the object
or event itself which make certain objects ipso facto
not art and incapable of being redefined in that way.
The constraints that undoubtedly exist in any specific art world on what can be defined as art arise from
a prior consensus on what kinds of standards will be
applied, and by whom, in making those judgments. Art
world members characteristically, despite all their doctrinal and other differences, produce quite reliable
judgments about which artists and works are serious
and therefore worthy of attention. Thus, jazz players
who disagree over stylistic preferences can nevertheless agree on whether a given performer or performance "swings," and theater people likewise make
quite reliable judgments of whether a particular scene
''works.'' Artists may disagree violently over which
works and their makers should receive support, and
marginal cases (especially those in styles just being incorporated into the conventional practice of the art
world or those on the verge of being thrown out as no
longer worthy of serious consideration) will provoke
less reliable judgments. But most judgments are reliable, and that reliability reflects not the mouthing of
already agreed-on judgments but rather the systematic application by trained and experienced members
of the art world of similar standards; it is what Hume
(1854) described in his essay on taste, and it is similar
to the way a group of doctors, confronted with a set of
clinical findings, will arrive at a similar diagnosis (analogies can be found in every area of specialized work).
In that sense, not everything can be made into a
work of art, just by definition or the creation of consensus, for not everything will pass muster under currently accepted standards in the art world. But this
does not mean that there is any more to making something art than, to use Cohen's term, christening it. It is
also a matter of christening if the entire art world
agrees on standards that, if they are automatically applied, some works clearly meet, so that their classification as art is self-evident, and others as clearly fail to
meet; the consensus arises because reasonable members of the world will have no difficulty in classifying
works under such circumstances. Constraints on what
can be defined as art exist, but they constrain because
of the conjunction of the characteristics of objects and
the rules of classification current in the world in which
they are proposed as art works .
Further, those standards, being matters of consensus, change. Much of the running dialogue of artists and other participants in art worlds has to do with
making day-to-day adjustments in the content and application of standards of judgment. In the early 1 930s
jazz players, critics, and aficionados all agreed that
electrical instruments could not produce real music.
Charlie Christian's performances on the electric guitar
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convinced so many people that they were having the
same sort of experience from his playing that they did
from music played on a nonelectric instrument that the
canon was quickly revised.
How much? Aestheticians, both th e institutionalists
and their critics, worry about the effect of aesthetic
theorizing on artists and art worlds. They express the
fear, for instance, that an aesthetic theory which is too
restrictive will be unnecessarily depressing to artists
and might perhaps unduly constrict their creativity.
This overestimates the degree to which art worlds take
their direction from aesthetic theorizing; the influence
probably runs in the other direction . But the institutionalists draw one important implication from their analysis: Practicing artists, if they want to have their work
accepted as art, will have to persuade the appropriate
people to certify what they have done as art. (While the
basic institutional analysis suggests that anyone can
do that, in practice these theorists accept the existing
art world as the one which has to be persuaded to do
the job.) But if art is what an art world ratifies as art,
then I might suggest an alternative strategy, one I have
analyzed in more detail elsewhere (Becker 1975,
1979)-the strategy of organizing an art world de
novo, which will then ratify as art what one produces.
In fact, the strategy has been used often and with considerable success. Others have tried it and failed, but
that does not mean it is not a reasonable possibility.
Several difficulties arise in creating a new art world
to ratify work which has no home in already existing
art worlds. Resources (especially financial support)
will probably have been allocated to already existing
artistic activities, so that one needs to develop new
sources of support, new pools of personnel, and new
sources of materials and other facilities (including
space in which to perform and display works). Since
existing aesthetic theories have not ratified the work, a
new aesthetic must be developed and new modes of
criticism and standards of judgment enunciated. To
say that these things must be done, however, raises an
interesting question of the definitional kind that philosophical analysis provokes. How much of the apparatus of an organized art world must be created before
the work in question will be treated seriously by a
larger audience than that supporting the original group
that wanted to create the new world? What it takes to
convince people will vary a great deal. Some will require an elaborate ideological explanation. Others-theater managers, operators of recording studios, printers-will ask only for guarantees that their
bills be paid.
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This question need not, indeed should not, be answered by enunciating criteria. Rather, we should realize that the activities involved can be carried on by
varying numbers of people, and without the full-blown
institutional apparatus of such a well-equipped world
as that, for instance, which surrounds contemporary
sculpture and painting or symphonic music and grand
opera. When we speak of art worlds, we usually have
in mind these well-equipped ones, but in fact paintings, books, music, and all sorts of artistic objects and
performances can be produced without all the support
personnel these worlds have and are dependent on:
critics, impresarios, furnishers of materials and equipment, providers of space, audiences. At an extreme,
remember, any artistic activity can in principle be done
by one person, who performs all the necessary activities (Becker 1976); this is not common and not a condition many artists aspire to (though one they sometimes yearn for when they have trouble with their
fellow participants). As the number of people involved
grows, a point is reached at which some stable nucleus of people cooperates regularly to produce the
same sort of work; as the number grows larger than
that, a point might be reached at which individual artists can produce work for a large audience of people
they do not know personally and still have a reasonable expectation of being taken seriously. Call that
first point of organization an esoteric world, and the
latter an exoteric one. The names and cut-off points
are not so important as the recognition that these are
more or less arbitrary, the reality being a variety of
points that vary along several continua.
How many? Neither Dickie nor Danto is very clear
as to how many art worlds there are . Dickie says:
The artworld consists of a bundle of systems: theater,
painting, sculpture, literature, music, and so on, each of
which furnishes an institutional background for the conferring of status on objects within its domain. No limit can be
placed on the number of systems that can be brought under the generic conception of art, and each of the major
subsystems contains further subsystems. These features
of the artworld provide the elasticity whereby creativity of
even the most radical sort can be accommodated. A whole
new system comparable to the theater, for example, could
be added in one fell swoop. What is more likely is that a
new subsystem would be added within a system. For example, junk sculpture added within sculpture, happenings
added within theater. Such additions might in time develop
into full-blown systems. [Dickie 1975:33]

Blizek (197 4) sees that there is an empirical question
in this but also sees that the definition of '' artworld'' is
so loose that it is not clear whether there is one artworld, of which these are subparts, or a number of
them, possibly unrelated; further, that if there are a
number of artworlds they might conflict. Several observations are relevant here.
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1 Empirically, we can see that not only are there the

worlds of various art media, but that these may be subdivided at times into quite separate and almost noncommunicating segments. I have spoken of schools
and styles as though they competed for the same rewards and audiences, but often they do not. Instead,
members of one group develop audiences and other
sources of support from sectors of society that would
not have supported those other art world segments
with whom they might compete. Thus, many painting
worlds rely on the same suppliers as recognized contemporary artists for materials, but have quite separate, and often very successful, arrangements for exhibiting, distributing, and supporting their work. The
Cowboy Artists of America, for instance, produce
paintings for people who would like to buy works by
Charles Russell and Frederick Remington, genre
painters of the American cowboy West whose work is
exhibited in "real" museums, but cannot afford them
or cannot find any to buy:
Despite determined inattention by Eastern art critics, cowboy painting and sculpture are so popular that their prices
are inflating faster than intrastate natural gas. Cowboy art
has its own heroes, its own galleries and even its own publishing house. [Lichtenstein 1977:41]

Regional segments are not so isolated as this, tending
to be oriented to the metropolitan centers of the "big"
art world (McCall1977). Their participants suffer from
a lack of exhibition opportunities but even more from
the sense that success in their region will do them little
or no good in the larger world they aspire to but which
is almost totally unaware of them.
2 If we define art worlds by the activities their participants carry on collectively (Becker 197 4), we can approach the problem of a general art world by asking
what activities a general art world-one which encompasses all the conventional arts- might carry on collectively in such a way that we might want to refer to it
as one art world. I can think of two. On the one hand
the various media-oriented subcommunities suffer '
from many of the same external problems. Thus, a depression might make it harder for all the specific art
forms to secure financial support (although the experience of the Great Depression in the United States
does not wholly bear this out). A common situation is
one in which the government imposes censorship on
all the arts in a similar way, so that the experience of
people in one arena can be read as a sign of what one
can expect in another. Thus a theatrical designer
might make his own professional decisions on the
basis of what the censors might do about a play he is
interested in, arriving at the assessment by hearing
about what they have done about a recording by a
popular singer, a recent novel, or a new film. Insofar as
the participants in all these worlds share experiences,

interpretations, and predictions vis-a-vis the censors,
they might be said to be engaging in a form of collective activity and thus to constitute an art world.
In another direction, artists in various mediaoriented worlds may find that they want to achieve similar kinds of things in their work and share ideas and
perspectives on how to accomplish that. For example,
during periods of intense nationalism, many artists
may see it as their job to somehow symbolize the character and aspirations of their country or people in the
works they create. To do that, they have to find imagery and techniques which will convey the ideas and
feelings they have in mind as well as finding the ideas
and feelings themselves. Insofar as participants in various worlds debate these questions across media
lines, they might be said to be participants in one general art world.
3 Particular artistic institutions often use people from
other fields as support personnel for the work that is
central in their own field. Thus, visual artists create
settings for theatrical and dance performances, writers
produce librettos for operas, musicians compose and
play backgrounds for films, and so on. Insofar as these
activities bring people together across subworld lines,
they might be said to be participating in a general art
world. Furthermore, because of these possibilities,
people from worlds not already connected in this way
may find it interesting to contemplate new forms of collaboration, thus creating further links in the general art
world. Finally, participants in specific art worlds often
come from a limited sector of the environing society,
for instance, the educated upper middle class or petty
aristocracy. They will thus have connections with eacn
other by virtue of having attended school together or
coming from families connected by kinship or friendship, and these connections will serve to create a general art world or, at least, to provide the basis in regular associations which might enable them to
collaborate in the kinds of activities already mentioned.
The analysis of this problem makes clear that
speaking of art worlds means using shorthand. ''Art
world," remember, is just a way of talking about
people who participate in the making of art works in a
routine way. The routine interaction is what constitutes
the art world's existence, so questions of definition
can generally be resolved by looking at who actually
participates with whom in doing what. In that way, the
logical and definitional problems of the institutional
aesthetic theory (which has a strong empirical component) can be resolved by knowledge of the facts of
any particular case.
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Aesthetics and Art Worlds
The institutional theory of aesthetics, as we have seen,
itself illustrates the process analyzed in the first part of
this paper. When an established aesthetic theory does
not provide a logical and defensible legitimation of
what artists are doing and, more important, what the
other institutions of the art world-especially distribution organizations and audiences-accept as art and
as excellent art, professional aestheticians will begin
to provide the required new rationale. If they do not,
someone else probably will, although the rest of the
participants might just go ahead without a defensible
rationale for their actions. (Whether one is required
depends on the amount of controversy, engendered by
what they are doing and what they are confronted
with.) When earlier theories of art and beauty failed to
explain or give a rationale for the enjoyment and celebration of contemporary works widely regarded as excellent, given the amount of argument and competition
for space and other resources and honors in the world
of contemporary art, and given the number of professional philosophers who might find the problem intriguing, it was a certainty that something like the institutional theory would be produced.
By shifting the locus of the definitional problem from
something inherent in the object to some relation between the object and an entity called an art world, the
institutional theory makes it once again possible for art
world participants to find justification for their activities, and to be able to answer the kind of question leveled at their work that is philosophically so distressing;
that is, the question predicated on the failure to find
any trace of skill or beauty, thought or emotion, in the
works regarded as excellent, and the questions asking
if the same works could not have been produced by a
chimpanzee, a child, an insane person, or any ordinary
member of the society without particular artistic talent.
The latter example-that anyone could do it-is perhaps the most damaging. It suggests that artists have
no special gift or talent, and thus that the rationale for
regarding them as special members of the art world (or
the society), entitled by virtue of the display of that talent to special rewards, is fallacious. The institutional
theory allows art world participants to define that special talent in the new way, as, for example, the ability
to invent imaginative new concepts, thereby conferring
legitimacy on the artist's special role and rewards.
Looking at the institutional theory adds some
nuances to the description of art worlds. We see that
art world officials have the power to legitimate work as
art, but that power is often disputed, so that there is
room for argument. As a result, the aesthetician's desire for definitive criteria ·by which to distinguish art
from non-art, insofar as those criteria might be found
in or be expected to be congruent with the actions of
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art world officials, cannot be satisfied. That is of some
interest because aestheticians are not the only ones
with such a desire. In fact, sociologists often insist that
fields such as the sociology of art or religion or science settle on some definitive criterion of their subject
matter. If that criterion is expected to be congruent
with either popular or official conceptions of art, the
sociological wish for a definitive criterion is likewise
unsatisfiable.
We see too that, in principle, any kind of object or
action can be legitimated as art, but that in practice
every art world has procedures and rules for making
those distinctions which, while not clearcut or foolproof, nevertheless make the success of some candidates for the status of art work very unlikely. Those
procedures and rules are contained in the conventions
and patterns of cooperation by which art worlds carry
on their routine activities.
Finally, we see how it might be possible to speak of
all the arts as comprising one big art world. Insofar as
members of specialized subworlds cooperate in some
activities related to their work, that cooperative activity-be it vis-a-vis government censorship, the development of nationalist art, or whatever-can be seen as
the operation of one big art world. Such cooperation
may be relatively uncommon, and probably is most of
the time in any society, so that we might want to say
that the operative art worlds are those of the particular
media; but this question, like the others, is empirical,
and its answer will be found by research.

Note
An earlier version of this paper was given at the Fifth Annual Conference
on Social Theory and the Arts , Syracuse University) April 1978 . It will
appear in a slightly different form in my forthcoming book , Art Worlds
(tentative title}, to be published by the University of California Press .
Some ideas referred to briefly in this paper are explained more fully in
Art Worlds , and in my earlier papers as noted in the text.
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